Evaluation of Littoral Combat Ships for open-ocean anti-submarine warfare by Valerio, Victor et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-03
Evaluation of Littoral Combat Ships for open-ocean
anti-submarine warfare
Valerio, Victor












CAPSTONE PROJECT REPORT  
 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
EVALUATION OF LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS FOR 









Project Advisors:  John Green 
 Gregory Miller 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2016 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Capstone project report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
EVALUATION OF LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS FOR OPEN-OCEAN ANTI-
SUBMARINE WARFARE 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)   
Team LCS, Systems Engineering Cohort 311-143O 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This report evaluates the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and its potential to fulfill the open-ocean anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) mission. It is unknown whether the LCS platform can support open-ocean 
ASW. This report examines which LCS variant, Freedom or Independence, is more suitable for open-
ocean ASW. Initial analysis defines the open-ocean ASW problem space in terms of a threat analysis, 
mission analysis, current Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and current LCS capabilities. An Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) uses derived functional and operational requirements within a Pugh matrix to decide 
which variant best performs ASW, and what modifications can improve future designs of the LCS. The 
analysis shows the Freedom class has marginal advantages in performing open-ocean ASW mission tasks, 
and establishes three areas for improvement: self-noise emissions, weight, and communication. Potential 
solutions are explored to address these shortfalls and to analyze their impact on LCS’s ability to meet core 
requirements of the open-ocean ASW mission. This paper concludes that the LCS is capable of fulfilling 




14. SUBJECT TERMS  
anti-submarine warfare, littoral combat ship, mission module, systems engineering, 
requirements development, architecture, capability, functional decomposition, modeling and 
simulation, ASW, LCS 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
99 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Team LCS, Systems Engineering Cohort 311-143O 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degrees of 
 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
 
Victor Valerio Herbert Nichelson William Wascom 
AND 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ENGINEERING SYSTEMS 
 













John Green                  Gregory Miller   





Ronald Giachetti      
Systems Engineering Department    
 iv 




This report evaluates the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and its potential to fulfill 
the open-ocean anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission. It is unknown whether the LCS 
platform can support open-ocean ASW. This report examines which LCS variant, 
Freedom or Independence, is more suitable for open-ocean ASW. Initial analysis defines 
the open-ocean ASW problem space in terms of a threat analysis, mission analysis, 
current Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and current LCS capabilities. An Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) uses derived functional and operational requirements within a Pugh 
matrix to decide which variant best performs ASW, and what modifications can improve 
future designs of the LCS. The analysis shows the Freedom class has marginal 
advantages in performing open-ocean ASW mission tasks, and establishes three areas for 
improvement: self-noise emissions, weight, and communication. Potential solutions are 
explored to address these shortfalls and to analyze their impact on LCS’s ability to meet 
core requirements of the open-ocean ASW mission. This paper concludes that the LCS is 
capable of fulfilling the open-ocean ASW mission if improvements are made to the 
design and CONOPS. 
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The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class of ships were designed to be small, fast, 
and agile platforms that operate within the littoral environments. This paper explores 
which variant of LCS is best equipped to perform Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) in an 
open-ocean environment. This report also identifies what improvements can enhance 
LCS ASW mission effectiveness. Open-ocean ASW missions require searching and 
engaging submarine threats in deep-water environments over large areas, a mission the 
LCS was not originally intended to fulfill.  
This report analyzes the problem space of the LCS performing open-ocean ASW 
in terms of a threat, mission, and current capabilities analysis. Threat analysis shows that 
diesel-electric and nuclear submarines from North Korea, China, and Russia are the main 
threats to U.S. security that the LCS may have to prosecute. According to a China Daily 
News article published in October 2014, some of these threats can operate at depths up to 
600 meters and have self-noise emissions below 110 dB. Mission analysis defines 
functional and operational requirements for both general ASW and open-ocean ASW. 
The analysis focuses on addressing the specific requirements for open-ocean ASW such 
as transit distance, time on station, and accuracy and range of threat detections. The paper 
also focuses on weight and self-noise emissions, which are current problems for LCS in 
the littorals, but worsen when in an open-ocean environment.    
Three capability gaps have been identified that limit the LCS in performing open-
ocean ASW. Endurance is an overarching capability that covers how long the LCS can be 
on mission, whether it is in transit or holding station. Fuel is the limiting factor for 
endurance for the LCS. To address the gap in endurance, the report explores the impact 
of weight, fuel storage, and fuel consumption on overall endurance. Modeling shows that 
the use of MH-60R helicopters equipped with AQS-22 sonars greatly extend the range 
and accuracy of threat detections.  
This paper analyzes three categories of potential upgrades to LCS. Expanding the 
LCS data link capabilities would permit better integration of sensor data and coordination 
 xvi 
of multi-platform efforts. Additionally, LCS does not have radiated noise reduction or 
silencing features. Therefore, radiated noise reduction features like Propeller Air Internal 
Emission (PRAIRIE) and Masker systems, using machinery isolation mounts, and 
operational changes should be made to reduce the LCS acoustic signature. This report 
examines LCS modifications, which improve endurance and range.   
Utilizing the investigation into LCS capability gaps and open-ocean ASW 
requirements, this report provides several recommendations on how the LCS can meet 
these requirements. The report concludes that with the suggested improvements, the 
Freedom class LCS is capable of performing open-ocean ASW, and can meet the 
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The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class of ships, illustrated in Figure 1, were 
designed to be small, fast, and agile with the ability to adapt to modern conflicts in 
shallow water. The ships are capable of neutralizing asymmetrical threats that exist in the 
littoral battle space such as small boats, quiet diesel-electric submarines, and mine 
threats. Each variant is different and built by different contractors. 
Figure 1. The Two LCS Variants, USS Freedom (left)  
             and USS Independence (right) 
 
Adapted from Sam LaGrone, 2013, “LCS Mission Packages: The Basics,” U.S. Naval 
Institute, http://news.usni.org/2013/08/21/lcs-mission-packages-the-basics. 
Lockheed Martin and Marinette Marine build the Freedom variant, while the 
Independence variant is built by General Dynamics and Austal USA. Both LCS variants 
were designed to utilize modular-based mission packages that support different surface 
ship operations: Surface Warfare (SUW), Mine Countermeasures (MCM), and Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW). In order to fulfill operational requirements, the current 
Freedom and Independence LCS depend upon three mission packages for different 
warfare areas. Figure 2 illustrates these. The SUW mission package offers capability for 
neutralizing small-boat threats and providing littoral security. The ASW mission package 
provides capability for submarine detection, classification, and neutralization. The final 
package, MCM mission package, provides capability for detection and neutralization of 
deployed mines. Each ship is to be equipped with the mission package tailored to the 
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mission tasking and must be installed prior to the ship leaving port. Personnel can 
exchange the mission packages on the sea frame in a short time. This allows for quick 
responses to changing threats. The mission package paradigm permits a smaller vessel, 
utilizing modular designs, to serve in many roles against changing threats.   
Figure 2. LCS Mission Packages 
 
Systems that entail the three mission packages of the LCS. Adapted from Government 
Accountability Office, 2014, “Littoral Combat Ship, Additional Testing and Improved 
Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments,” http://www.gao.gov/assets/
670/665114.pdf. 
Initially, the United States Navy (USN) planned to procure 52 of the LCS class of 
ships and to have delivery of the first sea frame in FY2005 (O’ Rourke 2015a). 
Subsequently, USN reduced this initial number to 40 vessels, according to a memo from 
Defense Secretary Ash Carter dated December 14, 2015. Additionally, according to a 
press release issued by former Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel on December 11, 
2014, the original LCS designs have been rigorously re-evaluated identifying 
improvements to the design. Navy personnel performed the evaluation of both LCS 
variants, in order to determine if modified versions of the vessels could fill the role of a 
frigate. Hagel states that the original LCS designs could be improved upon by increasing 
both ship lethality and survivability. Additional areas of potential improvement for the 
initial LCS variants are identified in Figure 3; they included a variable-depth  
sonar (VDS), torpedo countermeasures, anti-ship missile defense system, surface-to-
surface missiles, radar, electronic warfare system, guns, and Multifunction Towed Array 
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(MFTA). According to Hagel, these improvements would permit a more survivable LCS 
with increased sensor capability. 
Figure 3. Follow-on Class Requirements 
 
Adapted from Christopher P. Cavas, 2014, “A closer look at the “Modified LCS,” 
http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/12/a-closer-look-at-the-modified-lcs. 
In addition to the analysis and improvements of LCS suggested by USN 
personnel, each of the prime contractors associated with both LCS variants have 
proposed improvements to their original LCS designs. 
Lockheed Martin, a contractor associated with the Freedom variant, has proposed 
three potential follow-on designs to the LCS shown in Figure 4, and are named the Small 
Surface Combatant (SSC), the Surface Combat Ship (SCS), and the Multi-Mission 
Combat Ship (MMCS) variants. These vessels are intended for export as well as potential 
domestic uses.  
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The Small Surface Combatant variant is designed to have enhanced defensive 
systems and more firepower in order to focus on surface and air targets. There exists less 
emphasis on the multi-role capability that mission packages provide, and more emphasis 
on standalone systems. The SSC can support surface and air warfare missions and 
removes mission package systems from the sea frame. 
The proposed Surface Combat Ship variant will include an Aegis combat system 
used in national missile defense. 
The Multi-Mission Combat Ship variant has been designed with a smaller hull 
and will be operated by a smaller crew. The primary mission of the MMCS will be as a 
patrol vessel (Sweetman 2008, 7). This class is smaller and slower than the current LCS 
variants and can support border protection and counter-piracy missions (General 
Dynamics 2015).   
Figure 4. Potential LCS Freedom Follow-on Designs 
 
Follow-on designs to the LCS are named the Small Surface Combatant (SSC) (bottom of 
figure), the Surface Combat Ship (SCS) (middle of figure), and the Multi-Mission 
Combat Ship (MMCS) (top of figure) variants. Source: Defense Industry Daily, 2015, 
“LCS: The USA’s Littoral Combat Ships,” http:// http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/
the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-01343/. 
General Dynamics, the prime contractor of the LCS Independence variant, has 
also proposed follow-on designs. Follow-on LCS Independence variants are to serve as 
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either a small surface combatant or a border patrol and counter piracy vessel. Discussion 
of these variants has been included to illustrate potential future roles LCS may fill. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In FY2014, by the direction of the secretary of defense, the LCS program was 
restructured (O’ Rourke 2015a). According to O’Rourke, to fill the capability gap left by 
the decommissioning of all U.S. Naval Frigate–class ships, the last 20 LCS class ships 
will have a Frigate classification and improved capabilities relative to the base LCS 
design. O’Rourke also indicates that the new Frigate design enhancements will focus on 
SUW and ASW operations. Additionally, O’Rourke claims that the current fleet of 
existing LCSs will carry out MCM operations. As the original LCSs were not designed 
for open-ocean ASW operations, it is unknown if the restructured program is viable. That 
is, there is no evidence or analysis to support or refute the LCS’s ability to carry out this 
new mission. Further, it is unknown which variant (Freedom or Independence) is more 
suitable for the mission. Additionally, it is likely that some ship or mission package 
modifications would be required. However, no one yet knows what equipment or 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) would be affected. Therefore, it is not possible to 
make informed programmatic decisions based on improved capabilities versus their 
associated costs.  
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this report is to determine whether the LCS can execute open-
ocean ASW missions. One aspect of the evaluation is an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
to determine if one variant is better than the other is at performing open-ocean ASW. 
This report makes recommendations on how to improve that variant for open-ocean 
ASW. In addition to a CONOPS, requirements for open-ocean ASW for LCS were 
developed. This report provides answers to the following research questions:  
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(1) Which LCS variant performs open-ocean ASW better? 
(2) What changes need to be made to the LCS to facilitate effective open-
ocean ASW?  
(3) How effective will the proposed solution be at open-ocean ASW? 
(4) How much will the proposed solution cost? 
(5) How much more effective will the proposed solution be compared to the 
current LCS platforms? 
This report provides a feasibility study on whether the LCS platform is suitable 
for conducting open-ocean ASW with the assumption that the LCS platform can 
adequately defend itself. Additionally, this report identifies capability gaps existing 
between the requirements of open-ocean ASW and the current capability of the LCS.  
Big-budget military programs often attract scrutiny from the public. Public 
opinion influences political decisions, which have significant impacts upon military 
programs. The results of the study serve to inform the public on whether or not the LCS 
platforms’ potential open-ocean ASW mission is a worthy investment of their tax dollars. 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The capstone report team utilized an iterative systems engineering process model 
when answering the research questions. The team approached the research questions with 
an open mind, explored all possible solutions, and developed a recommendation to best 
utilize LCS for open-ocean ASW. The iterative process focused on analysis of the 
problem space, identifying system requirements, analysis of the system elements and 
analysis of mission effectiveness. Figure 5 illustrates this process and the interactions of 
each step. 
 7 
Figure 5. Systems Engineering Process 
 
 
(1) Analysis of Problem Space  
This research team identified and analyzed problems associated with the 
capability caps of the LCS in conducting open-ocean ASW. Additionally, a high-level 
threat analysis was performed to establish the threats that are associated with open-ocean 
ASW. The current mission packages and CONOPS performed by the LCS were analyzed 
in order to determine the differences between performing ASW in littoral environments 
versus the open-ocean environment. The results from the problem space analysis were 
utilized as the basis for the System Requirements. 
(2) System Requirements  
The open-ocean ASW requisites were translated into system requirements. The 
CONOPS was transformed into verifiable requirements that define what the system will 
do but not how the system will do it.  
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(3) System Element Analysis  
Potential new system elements that need to be either included or developed, 
modifications to existing system elements, and modifications to the existing sea frame 
were identified in order to find solutions that met the requirements established in the 
earlier section. The two variants of the LCS were compared against each other in order to 
determine if one variant was more capable than the other in performing open-ocean 
ASW. System elements and mission packages, as well as potential mission packages, 
were analyzed in order to determine the best possible solutions meeting the system 
requirements.  
(4) Analysis of Mission Effectiveness 
The various LCS system elements were matched to the established requirements 
and to the requirements addressed in the problem space analysis. Costs analysis was 
performed in order to evaluate the cost estimates and performance associated with the 
proposed solutions. The engineering process concludes with a recommendation on the 
best solution. 
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II. PROBLEM SPACE EXPLORATION 
A. HISTORY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 
With the advent of the submarine, naval warfare was forever changed. No longer 
were threats on the surface of the water but also below. Initial submarines were surface 
ships that would occasionally submerge. A submarine on the surface with all of her 
propulsion systems operating was easily detectable, but submerged with few systems 
operating, a submarine was a significant and quiet threat. As shipbuilders added nuclear 
power capabilities to submarines, the sub went from spending most of her time on the 
surface to being submerged for extended periods and being capable of launching weapons 
without coming to the surface. Submarines were also built to be quiet in the water, 
reducing the noise that could be exploited to detect her. ASW was a game of cat and 
mouse, reduced to detecting and neutralizing an enemy submarine before her weapons 
could be used. 
Off-board sensors were also developed that passively could detect enemy 
submarines. Passive systems increased the range at which detections occurred which gave 
commanders more time to engage an enemy and neutralize the sub before her weapons 
were used. Maritime patrol aircraft were also used in ASW. Aircraft were speedy 
platforms that could respond quickly to detection and initially localize the contact. Once 
localized, other platforms would be passed the information and engage the enemy 
submarine. The key to success in ASW was to be acoustically quieter than the enemy 
thereby detecting before being detected. 
B. THREAT ANALYSIS 
The success of the LCS mission to conduct ASW in the open ocean is dependent 
upon the capabilities of the threats that she will be prosecuting. There exists a large 
variety of submarines produced by many nations. Determining the threats that the LCS 
platform will need to prosecute is a matter of determining nations with which the U.S. 
has a less-than-friendly relationship and with which may have poor relationships in the 
future. To further focus this list, we have examined both unfriendly countries (see Table 1 
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for list of countries operating submarines), and those with the capability to threaten our 
interests through submarines with open-ocean capability.  
Table 1. Nations Operating Submarines 
Nations in bold operate submarines that were considered in detail for this report. Adapted from Michaele 
Lee Huygen, 2003, “Submarine Warfare in the 20th & 21st Centuries: A Bibliography,” report, Naval 
Postgraduate School 
Of the forty nations that currently operate submarines, based upon current and 
potential future relations, seven of those nations may hold conflicting military interests 
with the United States. While Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Venezuela are taking steps to 
improve their submarine fleet, they do not yet have the capability in the near or midterm 
to pose a threat to U.S. interests. This analysis will focus upon the greatest undersea 
threats, those posed by China, North Korea, and Russia.  
China and Russia both field a fleet of a large variety of submarines. This analysis 
will focus on a subset of these threats, threats believed to be of either the most lethal, or 
the most populous. In particular, this report examines the propulsion types of these 
threats, as these propulsion types change the way a submarine operates, and this behavior 
can be exploited through prosecution tactics. 
 
 
Algeria Argentina Australia Bangladesh Brazil Canada Chile China Columbia 
Ecuador Egypt France Germany Greece India Indonesia Iran Italy 
Israel Japan Malaysia Netherlands North 
Korea 
Norway Pakistan Peru Poland 




Spain Sweden Taiwan 
Turkey United 
Kingdom 
Venezuela Vietnam      
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1. North Korea 
While North Korea’s fleet has aged over the years, it is determined to attack our 
South Korean ally when it calculates that the benefit far exceeds the risk: “[North 
Korea’s] submarine force, unsophisticated but durable, demonstrated its capabilities in 
March 2010 when it covertly attacked and sank the ROK warship Cheonan with an 
indigenously produced submarine and torpedo” (Office of the Secretary of Defense 
2013). The submarine that ROK deployed to sink the Cheonan was a midget-class 
submarine that does not have open-ocean capability. This provocation does demonstrate 
North Korea’s resolve to attack the U.S. and her allies. North Korea is a nuclear-armed 
power, and has been developing the capability to deploy nuclear weapons via ballistic 
missiles, possibly through Vertical Launch System (VLS) equipped submarines (Office 
of the Secretary of Defense 2013). 
North Korea’s navy is one of the world’s largest submarine forces, with 
approximately seventy attack-, coastal-, and midget-type submarines (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense 2013). They have stated that the capability to strike the U.S 
homeland is one of their military objectives. North Korea claims to have successfully test 
fired a ballistic missile from an indigenously built submarine, demonstrating its growing 
capability as a threat (Daily Mail 2015). The LCS will have to be able to prosecute 
submarines currently existing in North Korea’s fleet, and those that it is actively working 
to procure. 
a. Romeo Class Submarine 
  The Romeo class submarine, which is built by the former Soviet Union, makes up 
the bulk of the North Korean submarine fleet. It operates an estimated 77 Romeo class 
submarines (Bermudez 2014). Bermudez states that these submarines were built in the 
1950s, and are aging. They are not sophisticated and represent Soviet technology 
developed in the early years of the Cold War. They are slow, sailing at 15.2 knots at 
maximum speed while surfaced (Global Security 2016c). They have diesel-electric 
propulsion. Diesel-Electric, while having become much quieter in recent years, used to be 
a large source of noise in the 1950s. That, coupled with immature sound dampening 
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technology, makes the Romeo class easily detected. However, as Global Security states 
that they have a surfaced range of 9,000 nautical miles, they are able to operate in the 
open ocean. Combined with the large population of Romeos in North Korea’s fleet, they 
remain an attrition threat that the LCS will have to prosecute successfully in a military 
conflict. 
b. Sang-O Class Submarine 
The Sang-O class submarine is a much quieter diesel-electric than the Romeo. It 
is an indigenously built submarine, first constructed in the 1990s. This is a reflection of 
more advanced, but not quite modern, improvements in sound dampening and diesel-
electric technology (Global Security 2016d). North Korea operates approximately 40 
Sang-O submarines. Global Security states that the Sang-O is a much slower submarine 
than the Romeo; however, it is a coastal platform. While this report is only concerned 
with open-ocean platforms, the Sang-O is investigated as it can operate at 1,500 nautical 
miles, which allows operation within open oceans near American allies. The Sang-O is 
equipped with Russian Type 53 torpedoes, which are especially lethal, as 
countermeasures are not effective against them (Bermudez 2011). 
c. Sinpo Class Submarine 
The Sinpo class submarine is a new class of submarine that is currently under 
construction. It is the largest of the North Korean built submarines. It may be a 
replacement for the Romeo class, but it could also be experimental (Bermudez 2015). 
The Sinpo will represent a significant step forward for North Korea’s submarine fleet. 
Additionally, it is possible that North Korea will outfit it with an Air Independent 
Propulsion (AIP) system (Keck 2015). Keck states that AIP systems allow submarines to 
stay submerged while charging their battery system. Traditional diesel-electric systems 
require submarines to surface in order to charge their battery system. During this time, 
the submarine is more vulnerable to prosecution than when submerged. AIP eliminates 
the vulnerability of traditional diesel-electric systems, allowing the submarine to 
continuously operate under the surface. Bermudez states that it is very likely that the 
Sinpo have the Vertical Launch System (VLS), and much evidence points towards its role 
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as a ballistic missile submarine. VLS provides the capability for a greater variety of 
weapon systems to submarines, improving their lethality. 
2. People’s Republic of China
China is neither an enemy nor an ally of the U.S. It does have conflicting military 
and geopolitical interests, however, and its growing capabilities are providing them with 
the confidence necessary to embolden them. They have territorial claims within disputed 
waters to which U.S. allies have claim, and they have long sought to annex Taiwan, a 
strong American ally. China has one of the largest militaries in the world and is funded 
by the second-largest economy in the world. 
China has demonstrated that it has the capability to take the U.S. by surprise. In 
November 2006, a Chinese submarine surfaced within firing range of the USS Kitty 
Hawk (CV-63) before being detected (Gertz 2006). Chinese capabilities and training 
regimen have grown more advanced since then. Its military is heavily investing in 
weapons designed to defeat American capabilities that it believes threatens its interests in 
the Pacific. Much of its investment has been used to advance its already diverse 
submarine fleet. It seeks to establish a new relationship, with American interests being 
subordinate to theirs. Figure 6 shows a Russian-made submarine purchased by China. 
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Figure 6. China’s Kilo Class Submarine 
 
Adapted from Lindsay Hughes, 2015, “Dragon vs Elephant, Chinas Offensive Naval 
Ambitions and Strategies,” http://defencyclopedia.com/2015/07/17/dragon-vs-elephant-
part-3-chinas-offensive-naval-ambitions-and-strategies/.  
a. Kilo Class Submarine 
The Kilo class submarine is a Russian-built submarine first constructed in the 
1980s. China acquired its first Kilos during the mid-90s, and had twelve in active service 
as of 2006 (Erickson, Goldstein and Murray 2007). According to Erickson, the Kilo is 
designed for anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. Additionally, Erickson claims the 
Kilo can be equipped with surface to air missiles, which potentially allows it to target 
enemy aircraft. Erickson states that the Kilo can reach speeds of 12 knots while surface, 
25 knots while submerged, and 7 while snorkeling. It is a diesel-electric submarine. 
While the Kilo is not a very quiet diesel-electric submarine, new variants are coming with 
modern sound dampening equipment. Additionally, Erickson suggests that like many 
diesel-electric submarines, it is possible that it can be equipped with an AIP system, 
enhancing its lethality through mitigation of detectability. With a range of 7500 nm, the 
Kilo easily can traverse the open ocean (Naval Technology 2016). 
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b. Song/Yuan Class Submarines 
 The Song and Yuan class submarines are Chinese-built submarines, with the first 
Song being constructed in the 1990s. China operates an estimated twelve active Songs, 
one hundred fifteen Active Yuans, with five Yuans under construction (Erickson, 
Goldstein and Murray 2007) . These are diesel-electric submarines, but some Yuans have 
been equipped with AIP technology. All Song and Yuans can be equipped with AIP. 
These ships are capable of traversing through the open ocean at 22 knots submerged 
(Global Security 2016e). They are heavily armed, anti-surface warfare ships, which have 
a maximum range of 8000 nautical miles, according to Global Security. As described 
earlier, the Song, which is less advanced than the Yuan, took the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-
63) by surprise in November 2006. It surfaced within firing range, before being detected 
(Gertz 2006). This demonstrated its capabilities, as well as the capabilities of the Chinese 
sailors on board. The Yuan is more capable, being able to submerge at greater depths, 
traverse at high speeds, and operate more quietly than its predecessor, Song. 
c. Shang Class Submarine 
The Shang class submarine is a modern nuclear powered Chinese-built submarine 
first constructed in the 2000s. China has completed five of these platforms, with two 
currently active, and one under construction (Global Security 2016f). The Shang is a fast 
nuclear submarine, being able to operate at 30 knots (Military Today 2016b). It is heavily 
armed with torpedoes, and boasts a VLS, allowing it to attack both subsurface and 
surface targets, according to Military Today. As a nuclear submarine, it can operate for as 
long as supplies exist for the crew, effectively making its range virtually unlimited. It can 
submerge to depths as deep as 400 meters and is a very quiet nuclear submarine (Global 
Security 2016f). The Shang represents a significant milestone in the Chinese submarine 
program, which continues to make more advances in the undersea realm.  
d. Type 095 Class Submarine 
The type 095 class Submarine, under development, is a future nuclear-powered 
attack submarine. It will be able to operate in the open ocean, will be equipped with VLS 
and have a significantly reduced acoustic signature (Lin and Singer 2015). According to 
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Lin and Singer, more than likely, it will be quieter than the Shang, putting it at less than 
110 dB. It is considered to be a “carrier killer,” as it will probably be equipped with the 
YJ-18 anti-ship missile, which was “specifically designed to defeat the Aegis Combat 
System” (Gady 2015). China claims that the 095 will have a minimum submerged speed 
of 33 knots, with a minimum silent cruise speed of 18 knots (Yee 2014). Yee also states 
that it will be able to reach depths as great as 600 meters and that the Type 095, if 
Chinese claims are accurate, will be comparable to, if not better than the United States’ 
Virginia and Seawolf class submarines. While experts believe these claims may be 
inaccurate, the Type 095 represents a significant threat to United States’ interests, a threat 
the LCS must be successful in defeating. 
3. Russia 
Russia has a complicated and turbulent relationship with the U.S. Before the Cold 
War ended in 1991, Russia, the former Soviet Union, was the United States’ main 
military and geopolitical rival. The two nations spent billions engaged in proxy wars 
against each other and were in a constant arms race for supremacy on land, air, space, and 
the undersea domain: “Since the early 2000s, high oil revenues have given Russia the 
opportunity to start recapitalizing and modernizing its military, which have resulted in a 
recent increase by 150 percent in spending for Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, and the 
setting aside of $160 billion for procurement of new naval ships and submarines until 
2020” (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2014). 
The following analysis illustrates that the Russian submarine fleet is a diverse 
mixture of both aging and modern platforms. Russian weapon systems are varied and 
capable. Russia is considered the only military peer to the U.S. and has the experience 
and growing will to re-establish itself on the global stage and project its power across the 
world.   
a. Romeo Class Submarine 
The Romeo was discussed earlier as part of the North Korean submarine fleet. 
Russia has built the Romeo class, and has exported it across the world as a part of its 
defense industry. As the Romeo was once a highly capable platform, Russia’s fleet is host 
 17 
to a great many of this aging platform. According to Global Security, Russia employs 
fifty-eight active Romeos within its fleet. These ships are being replaced. While the 
Romeo is not a highly capable platform, Russia fields a great many, and continues to 
manufacture this class with modern upgrades (Global Security 2016c). 
b. Kilo Class Submarine 
The Kilo class submarine was discussed earlier as part of the Chinese submarine 
fleet. Russia builds the Kilo class, and has exported it across the world as a part of its 
defense industry. Russia employs fifteen Kilo submarines (Naval Technology 2016). This 
platform is more capable than the Romeo but is also considered to be an aging submarine. 
Even so, the Kilo remains a threat to the U.S. interests.  
c. Akula Class Submarines 
The Akula class is a submarine built in Russia from technologies from the 1980s 
and improved in the 1990s (Military Today 2016a). Russia fields nine Akula submarines. 
They are nuclear-powered, can reach speeds as fast as 35 knots while submerged, and 
have an unlimited range (Military Today 2016a). These heavily armed submarines can 
target submarine, surface, and air threats. The Akula can dive to depths as great as 480 
meters (Military Today 2016a).  
d. Lada Class Submarine 
The Lada class is a diesel-electric successor to the Kilo. It is a more silent, 
improved Kilo, with the potential to be equipped with AIP. Russia currently fields one 
Lada, is building two now, and plans to build eight more (Global Security 2016a). They 
designed it for anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. According to Global Security, 
the Lada can reach 21 knots while submerged, and 10 knots while surfaced. Global 
Security also states that the Lada has a depth of 300 meters and that its range is not 
known, but given that it is an improved Kilo, it is highly probably that it will operate in 
the open ocean. As with many Russian platforms, not much more is known. Considering 
that this platform is currently built, and assuming it is designed with modern 
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technologies, it is probable that the Lada operates at less than 110 dB, possibly 
significantly less (Global Security 2016a). 
e. Yasen Class Submarine 
The Yasen class submarine is a modern Russian attack submarine employing the 
latest developments in submarine technology. It is projected to replace both the Akula 
and Oscar class submarines. It is a nuclear-powered submarine, which allows it unlimited 
range. It is heavily armed, equipped with VLS, and able to attack surface, subsurface, and 
land targets. Russia has completed production of two Yasens, they have fielded one, and 
are currently building four more with twelve planned for production (Global Security 
2016b). The Yasen is a threat in the open ocean and will be the most advanced platform 
the LCS may encounter. 
C. MISSION ANALYSIS 
1. Open Ocean vs. Littoral ASW 
The ASW systems and practices employed in the open ocean are not necessarily 
those that work best in littoral waters.  
Littoral ASW requires a complementary set of capabilities that address the 
special circumstances of naval operations in littoral waters. The littoral 
battlespace’s complex, noisy environment undermines the effectiveness of 
acoustic ASW sensors optimized for deep water, open-ocean ASW. In this 
environment, increasingly quiet and capable submarines operated by 
potential adversaries further erode the position held by open-ocean ASW 
forces. Quiet threats operating in harsh environments increase the utility of 
non-acoustic and active acoustic sensor systems. To be effective, sensors 
must be able to automatically adapt to the environment. (Department of 
the Navy 1998, Mission and Tasks) 
As ASW changes and evolves to the modern world, the current use of sensor-
based systems to fulfill the ASW mission may not be very effective. To respond to this 
new threat, a new approach has emerged called  “Full Spectrum ASW” (Toti 2014). Full 
Spectrum ASW pursues a more holistic approach to solving anti-submarine warfare 
missions. ASW becomes about defeating the submarine which can be done in many 
ways. 
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For example, [operations] in the vicinity of mines is possible without 
destroying all of them. All that is needed is that there are no mines near 
you and that you have a clear sea lane. Undetected but irrelevant mines 
become a nuisance but are not a threat. Diesel submarines can be thought 
of as smart, somewhat mobile, mines.  … Targets of diesel submarines can 
easily outrun and out endure their nemeses. To defeat the submarine, all 
that must be done is to render [the sub] irrelevant. (Toti 2014) 
Defeating the submarine can be accomplished by one or more of the following: 
taking it out of a firing position, making its fire control solution to be incorrect, having it 
pursue a different target, or rendering its weapons useless (Toti 2014). Open-ocean full 
spectrum ASW accomplishes these solutions to the problem. 
2. Open-Ocean ASW Mission 
Figure 7 provides a visual breakdown of the core mission areas within ASW, 
which consist of three main tasks: locating a target submarine, engaging, and surviving a 
possible counterattack. Locating a submarine consists of three subtasks: Detect, Localize, 
and Target. Detection is the capturing of noise and signal of a target submarine and 
classifying it as a contact. Localization is the establishment of the contact’s location to 
within a reasonably small area. The determination of a submarine’s bearing to ownship, 
range, and speed allows classifying the contact as a target. Once classifying the 
submarine as a target, it can be engaged directly or through other support vehicles. In 
addition to prosecuting a target, successful implementation of ASW requires the ability to 
survive an attack from the target, should the submarine be able to launch one.  
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The detection, localization, and targeting of a submarine is also known as 
searching for a submarine. Present CONOPS leverages passive sonar as the initial and 
primary form of searching. Passive sonar systems listen for acoustic anomalies in the 
surrounding environment. While searching for a threat, a platform must generate as little 
self-noise as possible. Self-noise, which is noise that a platform generates from crew and 
equipment, interferes with the radiated noise of a target submarine. An abundance of self-
noise can alert the threat to the prosecuting platform, or prevent that platform from 
detecting the threat.  
If a platform, or in the context of this report, the LCS, is able to detect a threat, 
but there does not exist enough information to classify the source of the detection, the 
LCS can deploy a helicopter with a dipping sonar. This helicopter can increase the 
chances of localizing and classifying the contact, as it is able to change its position very 
quickly, and its dipping sonar activity generates little underwater noise. The helicopter 
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can perform a parallel search pattern in order to increase the likelihood of contact 
localization. Figure 8 shows that a parallel pattern search equally searches across an area. 
The helicopter submerges its dipping sonar at the commence searching point (CSP), and 
then transits a distance known as the search leg. At the end of each leg, the helicopter will 
use its sonar capabilities to listen for the contact. At each leg, the helicopter will turn 90 
degrees to transit a new leg for a distance equal to the search width of the sonar system 
being used. This search width is denoted by the S in Figure 8 and Figure 9. Again, the 
helicopter turns 90 degrees so that it returns to the search area and continues the search 
leg. Repeating this pattern allows the helicopter to cover an area that is one-half its search 
width larger in all directions, denoted by the S/2 space between the search area boundary 
and actual search path.  
Figure 8. Parallel Pattern Search 
 
Used for a large-area search when the target location is not well known. Source: R. R. 
Hill, R. G. Carl, and L. E. Champagne, “Using Agent-Based Simulation to Empirically 
Examine Search Theory Using a Historical Case Study,” Journal of Simulation, 
December 1, 2006: 29–38. 
If there exists a high confidence in the location of the contact, a square search 
pattern can be used to assist in the classification of the contact, as well as forming a target 
solution. The square search CSP begins where the detection was believed to originate and 
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spirals outward. As shown in Figure 9, the searchers increase the search leg every other 
time. This creates an outwards spiraling effect that provides high coverage in the area 
immediately around the CSP. 
Figure 9. Square Search Pattern 
 
Used to provide high coverage over a small area. Source: R. R. Hill, R. G. Carl, and L. E. 
Champagne, “Using Agent-Based Simulation to Empirically Examine Search Theory 
Using a Historical Case Study,” Journal of Simulation, December 1, 2006: 29–38. 
Once a detection has been made, it is critically important to properly classify that 
contact. Classification involves determining the source of the detection and whether or 
not that contact should be investigated. For example, the detection of a school of fish or a 
pod of whales is not worth investigating and would only hinder ASW operations. In order 
to avoid problems such as this certain parameters are required before classification can 
begin. For classification the parameters are a number of pings and the accuracy of the 
contact returns. 
After proper classification, if passive sonar systems have not yet localized or 
targeted the contact, active sonar systems can be leveraged. Active sonar transmits 
acoustic energy into the water, known as a “ping.” These systems generate pings and 
listen for the reverberation of the ping off the target of interest. The acoustic pulse from 
an active source provides directional information (range and bearing) on a potential 
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submarine target more reliably than passive sonar systems. Additionally, when two or 
more active detections occur, it is possible to establish the speed and course of the 
submarine threat.  
There exist many methods for eliminating a submarine once that threat is targeted. 
Traditionally, three methods for attack are airborne, standoff, and close attack. The most 
effective method is the airborne attack, as the submarine has little chance for a counter 
attack. The aircraft are able to traverse near the target submarine and drop lightweight 
torpedoes in very close proximity. The LCS can house and launch two MH-60R 
helicopters. These helicopters can carry a payload of three MK54 MAKO lightweight 
torpedoes. The MH-60R helicopters can fly on target, drop the MK54 torpedoes, and fly 
away while the torpedoes prosecute the submarine. 
Platforms practicing ASW must also be able to survive an incoming attack so as 
to continue to provide ASW support for a battle group. Survival can be achieved through 
the use of evasion and countermeasures. Typically, when an LCS detects a submarine, the 
LCS will have its towed arrays deployed. The LCS is vulnerable while in this state, as it 
will be unable to evade any incoming attacks. The LCS can utilize decoy style counter-
measures that try to soft-kill the incoming threat. A soft kill distracts the incoming threat 
until it loses fuel and is no longer a threat. The LCS equipped with the ASW mission 
package has the Light Weight Tow (LWT), which provides counter measure capability.  
3. CONOPS of the Current LCS 
The LCS is equipped to handle littoral ASW missions. According to the 
Department of the Navy (1998, “Mission and Tasks”), the missions for littoral ASW 
consist of the following: 
Sea Control Operations — Includes tasks required to gain adequate control 
of the seas in the U.S. maneuver area and thereby secure U.S. objectives in 
regional operations. 
Choke Point Operations — Includes tasks required to ensure choke points 
are maintained free of submarines that would deter or prevent the passage 
and freedom of navigation through any restrictive or strategically 
significant geographic location. 
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Submarine Mission Denial — Includes tasks required to prevent or hinder 
an enemy submarine from accomplishing assigned missions.  
The open-ocean ASW mission consists of two sub-missions: Force Protection, 
and Operating Area Battlespace Dominance. Both missions include many of the same 
tasks as the mission associated with littoral ASW. Operating Area Battlespace 
Dominance includes Sea Control Operations, Choke Point Operations, and Submarine 
Mission Denial in a specified area of operations. Force Protection includes battlespace 
dominance, but has the added challenges of a moving area of operation. The radiated 
noise from the main force poses a challenge in this mission. The ships that form the main 
battlegroup are not designed with stealth as a priority, and can mask the sounds of a 
potential enemy. To overcome this, the LCS will utilize the “Sprint and Drift” technique 
described below.   
A group of two to three LCSs will be deployed to the outer screen of the 
battlespace, approximately 12 to 25 nautical miles from the High Value Unit (HVU). The 
LCS will sprint ahead of the main battle group. This ensures that the noise of the main 
battle group does not interfere with the passive detection of possible submarine threats. 
Once the LCS establishes an adequate distance is itself and the HVU, the LCS will 
deploy its towed arrays and use its passive sensors. The LCS will do this while drifting, 
to eliminate as much self-radiated noise as possible. 
The LCS can get on station very quickly and is able to deploy passive sonar as 
well as countermeasures. The biggest difference between open ocean and littoral ASW is 
the size of the area being searched and how long operations must take place before the 
LCS can restock supplies. The primary focus for proving LCS open-ocean ASW support 
will be to maximize the LCS’s ability to stay on station, reduce the levels of self-radiated 
noise, and increase the range and accuracy of detections. As a HVU escort, the LCS can 
utilize other battle group assets for target elimination, and instead concentrate on 
detecting and targeting submarines.   
The current 3500 nm range requirement for LCS (O’Rourke 2015a) is sufficient 
to support the these CONOPS.  
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D. CURRENT SYSTEMS IN LCS ASW MISSION PACKAGE 
The LCS currently utilizes three mission packages as illustrated in Figure 10: the 
surface warfare package, the mine-countermeasure package and the anti-submarine 
warfare package.  
Mission packages are composed of mission modules, mission crew detachments 
and associated aircraft. The mission modules are broken down into mission systems and 
support equipment. The mission systems are further broken down into vehicles, sensors 
and weapons.  
Figure 10. LCS Mission Packages 
 
Source: Defense Industry Daily, 2015, “LCS: The USA’s Littoral Combat Ships,” http:// 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-new-littoral-combat-ships-updated-
01343/. 
This report shall focus on the Anti-Submarine warfare mission package. The 
ASW mission package incorporates three mission modules: aviation, ASW escort, and 
ASW mission management/command & control. The aviation module is composed of an 
MH-60 helicopter with Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS), two Vertical Takeoff 
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VTUAV) and support containers. The ASW escort module is 
composed of VDS, MFTA acoustic receiver, launch, handling and recovery equipment, 
signal processing and systems control, support containers, Torpedo Defense Module 
(TDM), and the LWT countermeasure system. The ASW mission management/command 
& control center is composed of the Mission Package Application Software (MPAS) and 
network interfaces with the total ship computing environment as part of the LCS sea 
frame. The MPAS consists of mission-specific application software that supports the 
mission packages in planning and execution. 
The LCS ASW mission systems, consisting of both shipboard and aircraft based 
components, which are illustrated in Figure 11. The figure shows LCS deploying VDS, 
LWT, and the MFTA while airborne assets are depicted deploying sonobuoys and MK 54 
torpedoes. The systems are technically mature; the U.S. Navy has fielded them separately 
in other programs. These are described in the following paragraphs. 
Figure 11. ASW Mission 




The VDS is a sound-producing active system capable of being deployed below 
the acoustic layer and provides an acoustic signal, which reflects back form target 
submarines. The MFTA is a towed array sonar system capable of transmitting and 
receiving acoustic signals, including the signal generated from the VDS. The MFTA and 
VDS are towed independently at the same or differing depths and capable of being 
deployed simultaneously at transit speeds. The LWT is a torpedo countermeasure, which 
is towed behind LCS. LWT transmits ship-like sounds to generate a false ship acoustic 
signature in order to divert torpedoes from LCS (Keller 2013). The MH-60R aircraft 
features Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), Laser Rangefinder/ Designator (LRD), 
Inverse Synthetic Aperture (ISAR), Airborne Low Frequency dipping Sonar (ALFS), 
sonobuoys, and MK54 Lightweight Hybrid Torpedoes (Lockheed Martin 2012). The 
MH-60R is an ASW multi-mission air platform capable of detecting, classifying and 
engaging target submarines. The Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is the 
unmanned rotary wing aircraft, Fire Scout MQ-8B (Northrup Grumman 2015). This 
report does not include analysis of the Fire Scout, in order to limit scope to the LCS and 
the primary ASW aircraft used with it.    The mission system is also comprised of launch 
and recovery equipment and handling equipment.   
E. ACOUSTIC MODEL 
As noted previously, the LCS ASW Mission Package is equipped with a variety 
of sonar systems. These systems are the AQS-22 dipping sonar that the MH-60R uses to 
detect and target threats. The LCS itself employs VDS and MFTA towed arrays. These 
are advanced sonar systems, but as discussed earlier, the threats that the LCS must 
prosecute are continuing to grow quieter. As these ships become quieter, they will test the 
capabilities of the LCS sonar systems. The performance of the LCS’ sonar systems were 
assessed through the development of an acoustic model. This model was generated by 
using a combination of sonar equations and publicly accessible information regarding the 
LCS threats, as well as the sonar systems being assessed. Specifically, the acoustic 
model’s purpose is to determine the sonar-system’s probability of detecting threats at a 
particular range.  
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The VDS is a towed array sonar system that can operate in active mode. Active 
sonar systems generate a signal to be reflected off a target. The system then listens for the 
reflected signal. The reflected signal will be transformed by the physical properties of the 
object it was reflected off of (Furuno Electric Co. 2016). In the case of an LCS 
prosecuting a threat, if the signal is strong enough, the reflected signal may contain 
properties of a submarine. This information, once processed at the sonar, can be used to 
determine if a threat exists, and if so, at what range and bearing (Federation of American 
Scientists 2016a). The AQS-22 is also a sonar system that operates in active mode. An 
MH-60R lowers this system beneath the surface of the ocean.  
The MFTA is a towed array sonar system that operates in passive mode. The 
principles of passive sonar are similar to active sonar with the exception of the generated 
signal. Passive sonar does not generate a signal that reflects off the target. Passive sonar 
systems are constantly receiving signals (University of Rhode Island 2016). While this 
means that, in many cases, an active sonar system can detect a threat with higher 
reliability and at greater distances, a passive system does not produce a strong enough 
signal for a threat to detect. This allows for stealthier detection of targets. 
To increase the chances of detecting a threat, it is desirable to have a high SNR 
(signal-to-noise ratio). Noise lowers the amount of SE (Signal Excess) that a sonar system 
receives (Wagner, Mylander and Thomas 1999). Signal Excess represents the amount of 
signal that exists at the receiving sonar system after that signal has been weakened by 
noises and spreading losses. These noises can come from many sources. These sources 
include, but are not limited to, the noise of the ship leveraging the sonar, the effect of 
weather conditions on the ocean, and traffic from other non-threat ships in the operating 
area (Wagner, Mylander and Thomas 1999). The total amount of signal loss due to these 
noises, as well as due to the distance that the signal must travel, is referred to as 
transmission loss (TL). 
The sonar equations differ slightly between passive and active sonar. The 
effectiveness of the AQS-22 and VDS in active mode will be assessed using the active 
sonar equation, while the effectiveness of the MFTA will be assessed using the passive 
sonar equation. Detection Threshold (DT) is the amount of signal that must exist in order 
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to detect a target. Urick (1996, 17) states that, “When the target is just being detected, the 
signal-to-noise ratio equals the detection threshold.” This provides the active sonar 
equation: 
   (1.1) 
 
The left side of the equation describes the journey of the active signal. SL (Source 
Level) is the strength of the generated signal in decibels. It travels a distance through the 
ocean, weakening due to transmission loss (TL: Transmission Loss), is reflected and 
boosted by the sound generated by a target (TS: Target Strength), and returns to the sonar, 
all the while sustaining another round of transmission loss. The right side of the equation 
describes the sensing capabilities of the sonar-system (Urick 1996). Noise level, 
directivity index, and detection threshold are values unique to each sensor. Table 2 lists 
the different terms in the sonar equation, and what their value represents. 
Table 2. Sonar Equation Terms 
Terms Definition 
SL Source level radiated by the ensonifying sonar and measured at the 
ensonifying sonar. 
TS Target Strength, a measure of sound reflected by a target. 
NL Noise level, a measure of self and ambient noises. 
DT Detection threshold, the SNR required for detection. 
SNR Signal to noise ratio 
SE Signal excess, the difference between provided SNR and SNR 
required for detection 
TL Transmission Loss, loss of signal strength from target to sonar due 
to ambient noises. 
FOM Figure of Merit, value representing performance of the sonar. This 
value indicates “the maximum transmission loss the system can have 
and still be able to detect the target (at 50% of the time)” (Federation 
of American Scientists 2016b) 
 
2SL TL TS NL DI DT− + = − +
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The FOM of each sonar system to each target must be calculated in order to 
determine probability of detection. Fortunately, the active sonar equation provides us 
with enough information to calculate the FOM: 
   (1.2) 
 
This report’s “Threat Analysis” section identifies each threat’s source level, in 
decibels. Urick provides a value of 25 dB as target strength for a loud submarine. One 
calculates FOM using the target strength values, as well as the properties of the VDS. 
The terms used in VDS calculations are provide in Table 3. Table 4 describes the values 
used within the acoustic model for VDS against each threat. 
Table 3. Variable Depth Sonar Properties 
Term Value(dB) Reference 
NL 82 Noise Level derived from (Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound 
1996, 210) 
 
SL 221 Source Level derived from nominal values contained within (Urick, 
Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 412) 
 
DI 0 Directivity Index is 0 as omni-directional is assumed. 
 
DT 25 Detection Threshold derived from nominal values contained 













( ) ( )FOM SL TS NL DI DT= + − − −
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Table 4. Variable Depth Sonar Figure of Merit against LCS Threats 
 






Type 095 100 25 139 
Yasen 100 25 139 
Shang 110 25 139 
Akula 110 25 139 
Lada 110 25 139 
Sinpo 120 25 139 
Kilo 120 25 139 
Song 120 25 139 
Yuan 120 25 139 
Sang-O 130 25 139 
Romeo 150 25 139 
 
Source levels of each submarine were determined by using known values for the 
Romeo and Akula (O’Rourke 2015b) classes, and assuming a gradual decrease in sound 
profile based upon years commissioned, and advances in sound dampening technology. 
Information regarding target strength of each class of threat is not readily 
available. Urick assumes a value of 25 dB as a target strength for submarine, and this 
report will make the same assumption. As a result, instead of calculating the VDS 
performance for each threat, one will assess an approximate, “overall” performance of the 
VDS. This probability of detection must be calculated in order to determine the true 
effectiveness of the sonar-system. In order to calculate probability of detection, the 
formula for determining spherical spreading transmission loss will be used. Spherical 
spreading is assumed as this is typical of open-ocean environments. 
 2 20log( )TL R=   (1.3) 
 
In Equation (1.3), R represents the range of the sonar to the target in yards. This 
value is unknown, but it can be determined by rewriting the formula using the active 






=   (1.4) 
 
Equation (1.4) provides the ability to calculate a target’s range given the FOM 
and SE. For a 50 percent chance of detecting a target, SE must be equal to 0 dB. Using 
Figure 12, it can be approximated that for every 1 dB change in SE, probability of 
detection increases or decreases by 5 percent for PD (Probability of Detection) between 
10 percent and 90 percent. 
Figure 12. Probability of Detection vs. Signal Excess 
 
Source: William J. Hurley, 1980, An Introduction to the Analysis of Underwater Acoustic 
Detection, Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses. 
Using Figure 12 to map SE levels to probability of detection, and using  
Equation (1.4) to determine range, PD between 10 percent and 90 percent can be 








At 2 kyds, VDS has the capability of detecting threats identified with a 90% 
probability. At further distances, the probability of detection decreases towards 10% 
nearing 5 kyds.  
PD at range can be calculated for the AQS-22 using the same equations, as AQS-
22 is an active sonar-system. Figure 14 provides the results of these calculations. While 
the properties of the threats will remain the same in AQS-22 calculations, the properties 
of the sonar-system will differ, and are described in Table 5. 




NL 50 Noise Level, derived from (Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound 
1996, 210) 
SL 217 Source Level derived (NOAA 2008)  
DI 0 Directivity Index derived from (Urick, Principles of Underwater 
Sound 1996, 412) 
 
DT 25 Detection Threshold derived from nominal values contained 
within (Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 412) 
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Figure 15 shows that the ranges in which the AQS-22 can detect threats are 
significantly greater than that of the VDS.  
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While the VDS appears to be a better sonar based upon its greater SL, the AQS-22 
has the advantage of a much lower NL due to it not being in close proximity to its 
platform host. When NL is assumed to be equal for both sonar-systems, as demonstrated 
in Figure 16, VDS would rate as the more effective sonar, but not by a significant margin. 




The MFTA passive sonar-system’s PD versus range against LCS threats must be 
calculated differently than VDS and AQS-22. Passive sonar-systems must use the passive 
sonar equation:  
   (1.5) 
 
This sonar equation is similar to the active sonar equation, but it has two key 
differences. There exists only one-way transmission loss of the signal in the passive 
equation, and SL refers to the radiated noise produced by the target submarine, and not 
the signal transmitted by the host platform’s sonar. In this equation, NL represents not 
only the self-noise levels of the sonar-system and host platform, but also the transmission 
loss due to ambient noises of the ocean. Additionally, the equation to determine range to 
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target must also change in order to reflect one-way transmission loss instead of the two-





=  (1.6) 
 
Using Figure 12 to map SE levels to probability of detection, Equation (1.6) to 
determine range, and MFTA values as provided in Table 6, PD between 10 percent and 
90 percent can be calculated of the MFTA against a target at certain ranges. Calculating 
these values yield the results seen in Figure 17. 




NL 82 Noise Level derived from nominal values contained within (Urick, 
Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 412) 
DI 0 Directivity Index derived from nominal values contained within 
(Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 412) 
DT 8 Detection Threshold derived from nominal values contained within 
(Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 413) 
 
 
Figure 17. MFTA Probability of Detection vs. Range against LCS Threats 
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The MFTA is capable of detecting the Romeo class submarine at very far 
distances, much further than the active sonar. This is most likely a result of the Romeo 
class being a very noisy threat, and not indicative of the MFTA’s performance. This 
outlier skews the range into the millions of yards. Removing the Romeo from the 
calculations, as demonstrated in Figure 18, provides a more useful model. Overall 
performance of the systems is shown in Figure 19.  
Figure 18. MFTA Probability of Detection vs. Range against LCS Threats 
(Romeo removed) 
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III. CURRENT CAPABILITY GAPS 
The previous chapter presented the ASW mission analysis as it relates to LCS. 
Based on that evaluation, the following requirements were generated to characterize the 
LCS as a viable open-ocean ASW platform: 
1. LCS shall have a range of at least 3500 nm at a cruise speed of 14 knots. 
2. LCS shall maintain hangar capacity to store two ASW-capable helicopters. 
3. LCS crew shall be trained to support a multi-LCS ASW CONOPS. 
4. LCS shall be interoperable with other ASW platforms. 
5. LCS shall maintain a ship-silencing program. 
Comparing the current LCS capabilities to the capabilities needed for open-ocean 
ASW stated above, three primary capability gaps were identified which significantly 
affect the LCS’s suitability to adequately perform open-ocean ASW. Analysis of the first 
gap, Ownship Noise Control Capability, led to a sixth requirement that will be discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
A. OWNSHIP NOISE CONTROL CAPABILITY 
The first capability gap discussed is ownship noise control. Awareness of ownship 
radiated noise and control of it are critical elements of the ASW mission. The range at 
which an enemy threat is capable of acoustically detecting and classifying ownship is a 
function of the magnitude of ownship radiated noise. Therefore, ownship detectability 
and vulnerability ranges are defined by radiated noise. A decrease in ownship radiated 
noise can directly decrease the range at which the threat can passively detect, track and 
classify ownship (Urick 1996). 
The LCS’s acoustic silencing control systems must be addressed for the LCS to 
adequately fulfill the open-ocean ASW mission. This gap is understandable since LCSs 
were designed to operate in noisy environments where ownship noise control was not a 
concern. When LCSs were constructed, no effort was dedicated toward acoustic silencing 
control (ComNavOps 2013). Now that LCS will be preforming open-ocean ASW 
missions, ownship noise control should be a primary objective.  
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B. RANGE AND ENDURANCE CAPABILITY 
Another capability gap identified was limited range and endurance of the LCS. As 
weight of a ship increases, the endurance and speed of the ship decreases (Stavridis and 
Girrier 2006). Certain speed and endurance performance objectives are required to 
perform the sprint and drift CONOPS discussed in this report. According to a 
Congressional Research Service report, the LCS’s operating range is estimated at 1961 
nautical miles at 14 knots well below the 3500 nautical mile U.S. Navy requirement 
(O’Rourke 2015a). Furthermore, at 110 metric tons, the LCS ASW mission module 
currently surpasses the 105 metric ton design limit by 5 metric tons (O’ Rourke 2015a). 
The weight of LCS hinders her ability to meet speed and endurance requirements, which 
ultimately affects the ASW effectiveness. 
C. DATA LINK CAPABILITY 
The lack of a high capacity data link limits the communication capability between 
ships and aircraft and represents a gap for LCS. The MH-60R aircraft is capable of 
detecting and prosecuting enemy submarines. However, the aircraft cannot detect and 
prosecute in a single sortie. The aircraft cannot process sensor data it collects to be able 
to prosecute a submarine if detected while in flight. The sensor data must be passed to the 
LCS to be processed, and this requires that the aircraft land and the data downloaded by a 
physical connection. The MH-60R aircraft can utilize both Link 16 and the Ku-band 
Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) Hawklink System (Lockheed Martin 2011) when 
communicating with LCS. Each of those communication systems have different benefits. 
One benefit of Link 16 is that it has been widely deployed, permitting communications 
with many types of platforms, including ships, aircraft, space assets, and ground forces. 
Link 16 is a relatively low bandwidth, frequency-hopping, jam-resistance data link, 
which requires processing of acoustic data to be performed on the aircraft (Northrup 
Grumman 2014). Link 16 is capable of passing tracks, locations, and other post-
processed data outputs, but it does not have sufficient bandwidth to support passing bulk 
sensor data before it is processed (Northrup Grumman 2014). In contrast, the Ku-band 
TCDL is capable of passing bulk sensor data to other platforms for processing, thereby 
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allowing operators to be located shipboard (Nilsen 2011). LCS is only able to support 
Link 16 and is unable to utilize the higher bandwidth Ku-band TCDL.  
The previous chapter identified current LCS ASW capability gaps. The next 
chapter identifies potential improvements for each of the capability gaps. Additionally, 
the following chapter provides potential improvements to LCS ASW CONOPS.   
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IV. POTENTIAL LCS IMPROVEMENTS 
Once capability gaps were identified, the team evaluated various systems that 
could be potential solutions to fix the gaps. The recommendations in this report should 
improve the LCS’s ability to accomplish open-ocean ASW. 
A. ACOUSTIC CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS 
Because ownship’s noise is a limiting factor in ASW operations, there is an 
inherent need to reduce the LCS radiated noise signature. For the purpose of this report, 
the LCS source level was assumed to be 157 dB (Table 7) which corresponds with that of 
a corvette; a similar sized ship (Urick 1996). To be viable in the ASW role, the LCS must 
be able to achieve and maintain an acoustic advantage over threat submarines. Therefore, 
a nominal acoustic threshold of 140 dB was selected as a goal based on the results of 
Figure 23 and becomes the sixth requirement previously mentioned, with the 
understanding that further investigation is required to identify actual operational acoustic 
requirements. To achieve this requirement and to reduce the radiated noise of the LCS, 
the following acoustic controls need to be addressed:  noise reduction around the hull of 
the ship, noise reduction associated with propulsion, internal sound isolation, and 
ownship radiated noise awareness. 
U.S. Navy destroyers (DDG) and cruisers (CG) that conduct open-ocean ASW are 
outfitted with radiated noise reduction systems, specifically Propeller Air Internal 
Emission (PRAIRIE) and Masker Air systems (Saunders 2002). Both PRAIRIE and 
Masker systems are designed to reduce inherent radiated noise signature of the ship, 
thereby making detection of the ship difficult. By utilizing these systems appropriately, 
they provide a significant acoustic advantage during ASW operations. 
As depicted in Figure 20, the Masker Air system uses a series of belts that wrap 
around the hull of the ship beneath the waterline. Small holes are drilled through the 
entire length of each belt where diverted exhaust air is allowed to leak out and form 
bubbles. The bubbles create a blanket of bubbles around the ship’s hull when the ship is 
in motion and works as a noise attenuator (Surface Officer Warfare School 2002). 
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Masker is effective at reducing shipboard machinery noise that radiates into the 
environment. An alternative to the Masker Air system are acoustic tiles, which provide 
similar radiated noise reduction benefits (Global Security 2011). 
Figure 20. Master Air System as Shown on Ship’s Hull 
 
Source: Surface Officer Warfare School, “Ship’s Silencing Program,” Information Sheet 
Number 9.7, Newport, RI: Surface Officer Warfare School. 
The PRAIRIE air system uses the same exhaust air as the Masker system but 
implements it differently. PRAIRIE air reduces the noise generated by propeller 
cavitation. To that end, PRAIRIE air is distributed along the port and starboard propeller 
blade tips as seen in Figure 21 (Surface Officer Warfare School 2002). Bubbles released 
from the blade tips fill the void left by rotating blades as the water boils. This allows the 
cavitation bubbles to contract slower as the area of under pressure is minimized (Surface 
Officer Warfare School 2002). The resulting effect from this process is a significant 
reduction in propeller cavitation noise.  
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Figure 21. PRAIRIE Air System in Use on Propeller of Ship 
 
Source: Surface Officer Warfare School, “Ship’s Silencing Program,” Information Sheet 
Number 9.7, Newport, RI: Surface Officer Warfare School. 
Although the LCS has a water-jet propulsion system, further researchers should 
identify ways to reduce the LCS’s propulsion noise. Systems like the PRAIRIE and 
Masker air systems could be implemented on the LCS. Masker air belts could be placed 
on the hull of the LCS reducing the noise radiated to the environment. A system similar 
to the PRAIRIE air could also be implemented with the water jets on the LCS. A bubble 
blanket that surrounds the wake of the water jets may reduce the noise radiated to the 
environment. 
Another technique to reduce ownship noise would be sound isolation control 
using resilient machinery mounts throughout the LCS. Sound isolation mounts are 
designed to dampen or eliminate vibrations transmitted to the hull and thus into the water. 
The current LCS design does not have any of the noise reduction or control features 
(ComNavOps 2013). Sound isolation controls would further reduce ownship noise and 
improve the effectiveness of the open-ocean ASW mission. 
Ship operating procedures can also be developed to reinforce acoustic silencing 
posture. A ship silencing instruction can be developed which is hull-specific and used 
during ASW operations when ownship noise is required to be at a minimum. The ship 
silencing instruction is a document that records the quietest configuration of the ship, 
describing what machinery should and should not be energized, along with the ship’s 
most recent radiated noise information. To gather this information accurately, a periodic 
radiated noise signature evaluation of the ship would be required. The hull-specific 
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radiated noise signatures and acoustic related feedback can be used for mission planning 
and future improvements. Using this data, ships can model their counter-detection ranges 
based on the suspected threat and their operational area. This proves to be an invaluable 
tool when conducting sustained ASW mission operations. 
The potential acoustic signature improvement areas can be further described in 
terms of probability of detection and counter-detection. For the purposes of this 
comparison, an acoustic improvement of 25 dB was considered. To account for the 
acoustic improvement with respect to the mean performance of the MFTA, the values in 
Table 6 were utilized and the following noise reduction values were applied to the Noise 
Level (NL) parameter: -5 dB internal sound isolation, -10 dB noise reduction around the 
hull, -10 dB noise reduction associated with propulsion cavitation. Figure 22 shows the 
probability of detection of the relative acoustic noise reduction of the LCS platform with 
any combination of acoustic signature improvements. 





The model shows that as more acoustic silencing features are applied to the LCS, 
the probability of detecting a submarine that is a threat increases. Similarly, these features 
also affect counter-detection of the LCS. Equations 1.5 and 1.6 were utilized to generate 
counter-detection ranges and the input parameters are provided in Table 7. 
Table 7. Counter-Detection Parameters 
 











e NL 105 Noise Level derived from nominal values contained within (Urick, 
Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 375) 
DI 20 Directivity Index derived from nominal values contained within 
(Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 375) 
DT 8 Detection Threshold derived from nominal values contained within 
(Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 413) 
 
LC
S SL 157 Source Level derived from nominal value of corvette sized ship 
contained within (Urick, Principles of Underwater Sound 1996, 346) 
 
In a similar fashion, a 25 dB acoustic improvement was applied to the LCS source 
level. The counter-detection results are provided in Figure 23, which shows the 50 
percent probability of counter-detection of the LCS from a threat submarine. When the 
LCS’s radiated noise is reduced with the aid of acoustic silencing features, the 
corresponding counter-detection range also decreases. Due to the complexity of these 
features and the lack of historical data to reference, cost estimations associated with these 
acoustic features could not be generated. Further research is required to provide an 





Figure 23. Counter-Detection Reduction 
 
 
B. POTENTIAL CONOPS IMPROVEMENTS 
The LCS has been designed to tranist operating areas quickly and can deploy 
passive sonar and countermeasure systems. Differences between open ocean and littoral 
ASW are the size of the area being covered and the duration of operations on station. The 
focus of open-ocean ASW shall be to maximize the LCS’s on-station time, reduce the 
levels of self-noise and increase the range of detections. As part of the battlegroup, LCSs 
can concentrate on detecting and classifing submarines and other platforms in the 
battlegroup can neutralize the enemy submarine. Other differences are how the various 
sensor systems respond to the different environments. In littoral water, convergence zone 
detections are impossible and classification is difficult because of the higher noise levels 
and environmental noise in shallow water. 
Utilizing three LCSs together can employ a combination of active and passive 
sonar techniques to take advantage of multistatic signal processing. Multistatic signal 
processing employs multiple signal sources and receivers that are spatially separated. 
Passive and Active Multistatic Search (PAMS) uses three LCSs to create a multistatic 
acoustic system. While one LCS sprints to the next position, it actively pings through the 
deployment of its helicopters, searching for any enemy submarines in the area. 
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Simultaneously, the other two LCSs are drifting with their towed arrays deployed using 
their passive sonar systems. Figure 24 illustrates the phases of the PAMS cycle, and 
positions of the three LCSs. In phase one, the port-to-starboard crossover, LCS 1 sprints 
forward while the other two are drifting. Once LCS 1 surpasses LCS 2 along the threat 
axis, it throttles down to a drift and begins deploying passive sensors. In phase two, the 
starboard-to-port crossover, LCS 2 retrieves its passive sensors then begins to sprint 
ahead. Once LCS 2 surpasses LCS 3 along the threat axis, the cycle repeats with LCS 3 
retrieving sensors and sprinting ahead in a port-to-starboard crossover. 
Figure 24. Passive and Active Multistatic Search Cycle Using Three LCS 
 
 
Passive and Active Multistatic Search (PAMS) maximizes the mission denial 
capability of the LCS. Active sonar can target a sumbarine in as little as two pings. 
However, using active sonar can be innefectve, since possible target can detect and avoid 
detection. As described in Figure 25, a submarine detects the active pings roughly twice 




Figure 25. Maximum Beaconing Range Vs Maximum Detection Range 
 
 
The enemy submarine can determine by beaconing the location of the LCS and 
choose to evade detection or even engage the LCS. If the submarine evades then 
ultimately the HVU are safe. If the enemy submarine chooses to engage, the enemy sub 
can close half the distance to the LCS before the LCS can even detect the submarine. 
Using the PAMS techniques an undetected LCS may be able to corner an enemy sub 
avoiding an actively pinging LCS. Figure 26 illustrates how LCSs, using passive sonar 
sensors, overlap the area where a beaconed submarine considers safe to operate in. 
Figure 26. PAMS Detection Overlays 
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By continually overlapping the passive detetction area with the active 
transmissions area, a team of three LCSs can effectively create a submarine denial area. 
Employing several teams around the HVU, the entire battlegroup can be shielded from 
the possible entry of a submarine into an operating area. In order for the PAMS techique 
to be successful, the self-noise level of the LCS must be low enough or quiet enough that 
an enemy sub would have difficulty detecting it. 
C. RANGE AND ENDURANCE IMPROVEMENTS 
To perform open-ocean ASW missions effectively, the LCS needs to have greater 
range and endurance. Open-ocean ASW missions take place over a much greater 
operating area and do not always have refueling sources available, an LCS will need to be 
capable of staying on station for longer and travel great distances. Both capabilities can 
be simplified to fuel consumption of the LCS. The less fuel consumed, the longer the 
LCS can be on mission.   
There are two proposed methods for decreasing fuel consumption. The first 
method is to substantially lower the weight of the LCS ASW mission package. The 
reduction in weight of the ASW mission package should be dedicated to expanding the 
amount of fuel stored on the LCS. The other method is to change the operating mode of 
the LCS while in transit to decrease fuel consumption.   
Weight is a major factor in calculating displacement, which is a factor in 
calculating drag and fuel consumption during transit. Weight has a direct relationship 
with fuel consumption; a 1 percent decrease in weight results in a 1 percent increase with 
fuel efficiency. This relationship is in part the basis for “[t]he Navy is soliciting industry 
for suggestions to reduce the package’s weight by at least 15 percent” (O’ Rourke 2015a, 
33). The Navy is contracting Advanced Acoustic Concepts, L-3 Communications, and 
Raytheon to perform transition studies to reduce the weight. These results are still 
ongoing and not published, but all three proposals will reduce the ASW mission package 
below the 105 metric ton limit. 
For this report, the team investigated the improvements to range and endurance of 
the LCS by removing the VDS system from the mission package. While the VDS system 
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is very useful at local submarine detection, the team’s analysis shows that the most 
effective detection method is from the two ASQ-22 equipped helicopters. The VDS is 
most effective at close ranges making it less useful for open-ocean ASW. The VDS 
weighs 34.7 metric tons. By removing VDS, the ASW mission module would weight 
34.7 metric tons less, well below the 105 metric ton limit. The removal of VDS would 
also reduce the entire displacement of the LCS by approximately 1 percent. This 1 
percent reduction in displacement equates to a one percent reduction in fuel consumption. 
Figure 27 shows the difference in fuel consumption of the LCS with and without 
the VDS system onboard and shows that a 1 percent decrease in total displacement has 
almost no real impact on fuel consumption.   
Figure 27. Displacement Effect on Fuel Consumption 
 
A 1 percent reduction in displacement does not have a significant impact on fuel 
consumption rates. 
If the removal of VDS was replaced by extra fuel reserves, the LCS could greatly 
expand its onboard fuel. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
diesel fuel weighs 7.37 pounds per gallon. Dividing the 34.7 metric tons saved by 
removing the VDS by 7.37 pounds per gallon results in 10380 gallons of fuel that could 
 53 
be added to the LCS with no change in the total weight. This extra fuel equates to 
approximately a 10 percent increase in fuel storage. Figure 28 shows that a 10 percent 
increase in fuel storage will have about a 10 percent increase in overall range. 
Figure 28. Fuel Storage Effect on Range 
 
Exchanging the VDS for an equal wright of extra fuel improves range by an average of 
10 percent. 
The models for range and fuel consumption versus speed are based on twin 
propeller propulsion calculations developed by boatdesign.net. The LCS uses a water jet 
instead of the twin propeller used for the calculations, yet the effects on fuel consumption 
and range remain the same (Michael 2003). However, Michael states that the change in 
fuel consumption due to displacement and the impact of extra fuel storage on range are 
both representative of a waterjet propulsion hull. 
Another factor in fuel consumption is the control of the throttle while in transit 
(Burpa 2012). Burpa’s thesis explores the effects of mixed mode travel speed during 
transit to optimize fuel consumption. His thesis specifically looks at the LCS hull USS 
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Freedom (LCS-1), analyzing various potential missions in a Western Pacific deployment. 
Burpa’s thesis used the mixed-mode minimization planner, developed by NPS professors, 
with optimization tools to calculate combinations of throttle speeds throughout a transit 
leg. Burpa concluded that with the mixed-mode transit, LCS “will see fuel consumption 
savings ranging from three to 12 percent” (Burpa 2012, 65). 
Calculating the mission effectiveness achieved by implementing mixed-mode 
transit is rather straightforward. Mixed-mode transit can reduce the performance gap by 
up to 15 percent. However, the contractor for the LCS Freedom class states that the LCS 
is capable of over 4000 nautical miles at cruise speed (Lockheed Martin 2012). If future 
operational testing proves that the LCS is able to exceed 4000 nautical miles, then it will 
well surpass the U.S. Navy’s 3500 nautical miles requirement (O’Rourke 2015b). 
Measuring the increase in ASW effectiveness by replacing the VDS with 
additional fuel storage is more complicated. An increase in endurance is an increase in 
mission effectiveness because more time is available for the mission as opposed to 
refueling. However, the loss of a sensor reduces mission effectiveness because less 
information can be gathered possibly meaning more time must be spent on mission. The 
team analyzed the effectiveness of the three sonar systems of the ASW mission package. 
Figure 22 shows the average performance against suspected threats of the three sonar 
systems in terms of range versus probability of detection. In this graph, both the VDS and 
the AQS-22 were calculated as active sonar systems and the MFTA was calculated as a 
passive system to match their use in the CONOPS in this report. 
The AQS-22 system is by far the most effective of the three sonar systems. The 
other two systems are relatively equal in performance. While the VDS system does 
outperform the MFTA across the board, it is important to consider the CONOPS when 
determining mission effectiveness. Using PAMS, the LCS will only use active sonar 
while sprinting. One limitation of the Freedom sea frame is that it lacks the ability to 
utilize sonar systems at speed (Murphy 2010).   
Murphy states as speed increases the depth of a deployed towed array decreases, 
reducing its effectiveness to make detections. Figure 29 visually demonstrates this 
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relationship between cable depth, length, and ship speed. In order to utilize active sources 
while transiting at speed, the LCS must use the AQS-22 equipped helicopters. Once the 
LCS reaches the start position, it can begin the drift operations. While drifting, the LCS 
will deploy passive sonar capabilities to establish a multi-static acoustic network. The 
MFTA is the primary passive sonar system for the ASW mission package. As such, 
losing the VDS does not greatly impact the ASW mission effectiveness. The AQS-22 and 
the MFTA effectively performs the bulk of ASW mission tasks in this report’s proposed 
CONOPS. 
Figure 29. Relationship of Cable Length and Depth in Critical Angle Towing 
 
Source: Qihu Li, 1995, Digital Sonar Design in Underwater Acoustics: Principles and 
Applications, Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press. 
The best solution for range and endurance improvement will be a combination of 
both methods. The team’s analysis shows decreasing the LCS’s weight and adding more 
fuel storage will have positive results. The LCS is more capable if more fuel storage is 
added than by reducing total weight. Using careful throttle control and mixed-mode 
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transit increases fuel efficiency. The LCS could increase range by 22 percent by the 
combination of throttle control, mixed-mode transit and extra fuel storage. 
D. DATALINK CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT   
In order to address the datalink capability gap identified in this report, a higher 
bandwidth link that is compatible with current MH-60R aircraft is required. Thus, adding 
a Ku-band Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) as well as an AN/SQQ-34 Aircraft 
Carrier Tactical Support System (CV-TSC) to the LCS is recommended. The Ku-Band 
TCDL permits high bandwidth and line of sight communications between an LCS and a 
MH-60R aircraft as illustrated in Figure 30 (Nilsen 2011). The greater bandwidth allows 
sending bulk sensor data such as acoustics, forward looking infrared video, and inverse 
synthetic aperture radar data. 
The Ku-Band data link supports passing voice communications, contacts, tracks, 
fly-to-points, ship’s position, and plan position indications (Nilsen 2011). Inclusion of 
CV-TSC will permit transferring sensor operator duties from the aircraft to the ship as 
well as improving the common tactical picture available to decision makers (Nilsen 
2011). This advantage is achieved by the real-time data being made available directly to 
ship-board decision makers. CV-TSC facilitates integration of aircraft sensors with 
shipboard systems to detect, classify and localize ASW threats (Nilsen 2011). 
Additionally, CV-TCS can distribute and process sensor data, exchange tactical data with 
aircraft, exercise sensor control of off-board sensors, and reduce aircrew operator 
workload. These proposed improvements to the datalink and the processing of sensor 
data result in an improvement in the ability of LCSs to complete open-ocean ASW.  
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Figure 30. Ku-Band Data Link and CV-TSC. 
Source: Dean Nilsen, 2011, “Undersea Systems (IWS 5.0),” slides, Program Executive 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 59 
V. ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS 
A. COST COMPARISON BETWEEN LCS AND OTHER PLATFORMS 
This team performed a cost comparison of naval vessels possessing an ASW 
capability to determine the relative cost associated with each vessel. The cost comparison 
includes research, development, procurement, operations, and support costs, as well as 
service life of the LCS, Virginia class submarines, Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate 
(FFG-7) and other surface combatants. The comparison utilizes the results of an 
independent life cycle cost comparison performed by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), which evaluated existing and former surface combatants to the LCS 
(United States Government Accountability Office 2014).     
This team compared the life-cycle costs of the LCS to several other platforms, 
which are also capable of fulfilling ASW missions. Of particular interest was the 
comparison of procurement costs between an LCS and a Virginia class submarine. While 
the Virginia class possesses many capabilities that the LCS does not, the submarine cost 
is significantly higher than an LCS. The procurement cost of a Virginia class submarine 
in FY2014 dollars is $2,596 million (O’ Rourke 2015c), while the procurement cost of an 
LCS equipped with an ASW module in FY2014 dollars is $567 Million according to a 
GAO report produced in 2014. Additionally, the anticipated useful life of an LCS is 25 
years while the anticipated useful life of a Virginia class submarine is 33 years.   
The LCS was also compared to FFG-7. Since the LCS will replace the FFG-7 
(Freedberg 2015) this comparison is very important. Individual FFG-7 procurement costs 
were $579 million in FY 2014, according to 2014 GAO report. Table 8 compares the per-
unit costs associated with LCS, MH-60R rotary winged aircraft, the Virginia class 






Table 8. Procurement Costs (in millions of FY2014 dollars) 
  MH-60R LCS 
Virginia 
Class FFG-7 
Procurement $33.00 $567.00 $2,596.00 $579.00  
Service Life 22 years 25 years 33 years 33 years 
Total Procurement costs/
Service Life $1.50 $22.70 $78.70 $17.50  
(LCS procurement cost provided above include mission module cost) 
Adapted from United States Government Accountability Office, 2014, Deployment of USS Freedom 
Revealed Risks in Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs, Washington, DD: GAO. 
The procurement costs, on a per-year-of-service-life basis (since the service life of 
the vessels differ significantly), of one Virginia class submarine is roughly equivalent to 
the procurement cost per-year-of-service-life costs of approximately three LCS vessels, 
each equipped with two MH-60R aircraft and the ASW mission module. Additionally, 
this analysis resulted in procurement costs-per-year-of-service life for the LCS including 
the mission module of $22.70 million/year, which exceed that of FFG-7 $17.50 million/
year. 
In terms of manning requirements, the Virginia class submarine is staffed by 132 
crew composed of 15 officers and 117 enlisted (Saunders 2007). The LCS requires 40 
core crew sailors, 19 sailors attached to the mission package and 23 sailors in the aviation 
detachment that totals to 89 sailors (Littoral Combat Ship Manning Concepts 2013).   The 
FFG required a crew of 215 consisting of 13 officers and 202 enlisted (Schwartz 1981). 
Table 9 shows the manning requirements for the LCS, FFG-7 and Virginia class vessels. 
Table 9 Manning Requirements for LCS, FFG-7 and Virginia Class 
 LCS Virginia Class FFG-7 
Officer 18 15 13 
Enlisted 71 117 202 
Total 89 132 215 
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Figure 31 provides the GAO independent life-cycle cost comparison between an 
LCS and other surface combatants (United States Government Accountability Office 
2014). The GAO analysis resulted in a per year life-cycle cost (including research, 
development, procurement, operations, and support) of $79 million in FY2014 dollars. 
As Figure 31 illustrates, the LCS is estimated to be more expensive than Patrol Coastal 
Ships (PC-1), Mine Countermeasure Ships (MCM-1), and Frigates, yet be less expensive 
than both Cruisers (CG-47) and Destroyers (DDG-51).  
Figure 31.  Per Year Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Estimate 
 
Source: GAO analysis of Navy information (data), Department of Defense (photos), in 
Littoral Combat Ship, 2014, GAO report 14-447, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office. 
The cost analysis yields favorable results for the LCS in terms of per year life 
cycle costs when compared to Cruisers, Destroyers, and Virginia class submarines. 
However, the LCS is costlier than the FFG-7 in per year life-cycle costs. Figure 32 
provides an additional level of cost details for each type of surface combatant.   
 62 
Figure 32.  Surface Combatant Life-Cycle Cost Comparison 
 
Source: GAO analysis of Navy information (data), Department of Defense (photos), in 
Littoral Combat Ship, 2014, GAO report 14-447, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office. 
B. LCS ENDURANCE COST TRADEOFF 
Removing the VDS system from the LCS ASW mission package will reduce the 
overall life cycle cost of the package significantly, as it will no longer include the VDS in 
the procurement cost. According to the Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 
President’s Budget Submission Justification Book, procurement cost for a single VDS is 
nearly $13 million (Department of the Navy 2016). However, if the recommendation to 
remove the VDS from the ASW MP is not implemented until after mission packages are 
already installed, then there will be significant costs associated with uninstalling the 
VDS. There has been no demonstration of a removal of a VDS system from an LCS; 
therefore, there are no accurate projections for what this event may cost. A RDT&E 
Budget Item Justification report estimates it costs $4.2 million to: 
Install CAS/VDS ADM on Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) platform and 
conduct at-sea testing of ADM. Continue efforts to mature ADM to EDM 
level. Continue independent critical review and analysis of alternatives of 
 63 
selected and potential CNO ASW initiative technologies. (Department of 
the Navy 2013, 4) 
While the Advanced Development Model (ADM) and Engineering Development 
Model (EDM) versions of the VDS for the LCS are not exactly what will be fielded, they 
should be representative. Furthermore, the removal of the final fielded VDS system 
should have a similar cost to the installation of the ADM unit. 
The price of fuel determines the operational costs associated with implementing 
range and endurance improvements. The price of diesel fuel fluctuates. Most recent 
estimates calculate an average price for diesel globally at $0.83 per liter 
(GlobalPetrolPrices.com 2016). Replacing the VDS system with an equal weight of 
diesel will result in an increase of approximately $32,500 in fuel costs.   Mixed-mode 
transportation does not require any modifications to the LCS platform (Burpa 2012). All 
fuel savings will be a direct reduction in operating costs. For a hypothetical six-month 
deployment, Burpa estimates a fuel savings of 35,000 gallons, which equates to a nearly 
an $110,000 savings in fuel costs. Combining both extra fuel capacity results in a total 
operational cost savings of $77,500 for a six-month deployment.  
C. DATALINK IMPROVEMENT COST 
The cost of the proposed improved datalink and CV-TSC console is difficult to 
estimate. The authors have first-hand knowledge of a shore installation of a CV-TSC 
console and accompanying datalink hardware. This shore installation cost was 
approximately $250,000.00. Assuming the more robust requirements of a shipboard 
system with double the price, results in $500,000.00 for installation and procurement of 





D. LCS VARIANT SELECTION 
A Pugh matrix comparison, provided in Table 10, was used to evaluate the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the LCS Freedom class, the LCS Independence class 
and the retiring FFG-7 class. The FFG-7 was used as the baseline because the LCS will 
replace the retiring frigates. 
The LCS-1 Freedom class information used to assemble the Pugh matrix is 
available within a Lockheed Martin (2012) document titled “Freedom Variant Littoral 
Combat Ship: Full Speed Ahead.” The LCS-2 Independence class information used 
within the Pugh matrix comes from an Austral corporation document, published in 2009 
and titled “LCS 127.” The FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class Frigate information comes 
from a U.S. Navy Fact File, titled “Frigates-FFG,” published in 2015.    
The scoring of the Pugh matrix has five possible scores. A 0 indicates that the 
LCS is equal to that of the FFG-7 baseline for that category. A score of 1 indicates that 
the LCS variety is better than the base line. A 2 indicates that the LCS is much better than 
the baseline. A negative one (-1) indicates that the LCS is worse than the baseline and a 
negative two (-2) indicates that the LCS is much worse than the baseline. The FFG-7 












Table 10. Variant Selection Pugh Matrix 
 
Both LCS variants are equipped with an updated version of the Light Weight Tow 
torpedo countermeasure. The FFG-7 was equipped with an older version of the Light 
Weight Tow torpedo countermeasure. Therefore, the LCS vessels each exceed the score 
of the baseline FFG-7 in the category of torpedo countermeasures.   
Equipment deployment ease is largely a function of ship stern geometry. Both 
LCS variants are designed for deploying towed equipment and both are deemed to 
surpass the baseline FFG-7 baseline in this category. However, the LCS-1 variant 
receives a superior score because it possesses superior stern geometry for deploying 
towed equipment than LCS-2.    
ASW 







Torpedo Countermeasure 0 1 1 
Equipment Deployment Ease 0 2 1 
Configurability (flexibility) 0 2 2 
Helicopter Capacity 0 0 0 
Acoustic Silencing 0 -2 -2 
Ease of Helicopter Operations 0 0 0 
Variable Depth Sonar 0 2 2 
Sensors(Towed array ) 0 2 2 
Rotary Wing (RW) Torpedo  0 0 0 
Shipboard Torpedo 0 -2 -2 
General 
Speed 0 2 1 
Range 0 -1 -1 
Data Link 0 0 0 
  
Total 6 4 
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In terms of configurability, both LCS variants’ design incorporates the modular 
principles to support mission packages. Therefore, both LCS variants are much better 
than the baseline, FFG-7.   
Each of the three vessels compared within the Pugh matrix is capable of operating 
two rotary wing aircraft capable of launching torpedoes. Therefore, each LCS variant 
receives the same score as the baseline FFG-7 in terms of helicopter capacity and rotary 
wing launched torpedoes.    
The FFG-7 design incorporated both sound isolation mounts and a radiated noise 
reduction system. Neither LCS variant possesses sound isolation mounts or a radiated 
noise reduction system. Therefore, the FFG-7 greatly surpasses both LCS variants in this 
category.   
 With regard to ease of helicopter operations, both LCS variants have been 
designed with aircraft operations as a high priority and are equivalent to the score of the 
baseline FFG-7.   
In terms of both VDS and MFTA, each LCS variant can be equipped with both, 
while the FFG-7 possessed only an older model MFTA. Therefore, both LCS variants 
greatly exceed the score of the FFG-7 in each of these categories.   
The FFG-7 possessed a shipboard torpedo while neither of the LCS variants does. 
Therefore, both LCS variants greatly underperform the baseline FFG-7 with regard to the 
shipboard torpedo category.   
The sprint speed of LCS-1 is marginally greater than that of LCS-2 and both 
exceed the speed of FFG-7. Therefore, LCS-1 receives the highest score in the speed 
category and LCS-2 receives a marginally better than the baseline, FFG-7 score. 
Additionally, within the range category both LCS variants underperform the baseline, 
FFG-7 and are scored accordingly.   
The datalink between aircraft and ship for each vessel compared is equivalent. 
Therefore, each vessel received the baseline score.  
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 The LCS-1 has a marginal advantage over LCS-2 in two categories, first 
in the ease of towed equipment deployment, and second in sprint speed. Due to these two 
advantages, this team selected LCS-1 as the superior variant to perform open-ocean 
ASW.       
E. IMPROVED LCS COMPARISON 
A Pugh matrix comparison, provided in Table 11, was used to evaluate the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed improved LCS-1 to the existing LCS 
Freedom class, and the retiring FFG-7 class. The FFG-7 was once again used as the 
baseline of the Pugh matrix. 
 
Table 11. Improved LCS Pugh Matrix 
ASW 








Torpedo Countermeasure 0 1 1 
Equipment Deployment Ease 0 2 2 
Configurability (flexibility) 0 2 2 
Helicopter Capacity 0 0 0 
Acoustic Silencing 0 -2 0 
Ease of Helicopter Operations 0 0 0 
Variable Depth Sonar 0 2 2 
Sensors (Towed array) 0 2 2 
Rotary Wing (RW) Torpedo  0 0 0 
Shipboard Torpedo 0 -2 -2 
General 
Speed 0 2 2 
Range 0 -1 0 
Data Link 0 0 2 
  
Total 6 11 
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The proposed improved LCS-1 variant incorporates three changes. It adopts the 
recommended acoustic silencing improvements described within Chapter IV. This results 
in an acoustic silencing similar to that of the FFG-7 baseline. It includes the range and 
endurance improvements detailed in Chapter IV, which results in a range comparable to 
the baseline, FFG-7. The improved LCS-1 utilizes the improved datalink and CV-TSC 
described in Chapter IV of this report. This provides a data link superior to that available 
with the baseline, FFG-7. These three improvements result in a more capable open-ocean 






Through analysis of the problem space and the current capability gaps of the LCS 
in performing open-ocean ASW, this report makes recommendations for the 
improvements of the LCS. In addition, a cost analysis of the recommended improvements 
demonstrated that the recommendations are feasible. 
1. Operational Improvements 
Exploiting active and passive sonar techniques with the combination of more than 
one ship requires the development of new CONOPS for open-ocean ASW when using the 
LCS. The acoustic model used in this report shows that open-ocean ASW is possible with 
the LCS. The CONOPS developed herein employs a team of LCSs combined with active 
and passive sonar techniques to take advantage of multistatic signal processing. Certain 
operational maneuvers, such as sprint and drift can be incorporated to accomplish sea 
denial missions.   
2. System Improvements 
Certain capability gaps were identified that must be considered when utilizing the 
new CONOPS that were identified in this report. The capabilities addressed were 
acoustic silencing, excess weight, and datalink capabilities. In order for the new 
CONOPS developed to be effective, ownship noise needs to be controlled. The CONOPS 
would be worthless if enemy submarines could easily detect an LCS. Since littoral waters 
acoustically contain more noise and a higher level of sound than the open ocean, the LCS 
contains no acoustic silencing systems. Acoustic silencing features should be 
incorporated into the follow-on LCS design that will improve ownship noise and result in 
the LCS being difficult to detect by enemy submarines. The proposed CONOPS also 
involve the LCS sprinting and drifting, which require the LCS to have a large range and 
long on-station times. The current LCS weight limits the range and endurance and 
thereby limit the ability to accomplish open-ocean ASW. Simply removing certain 
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systems, such as VDS, from the LCS and adding in their place extra fuel storage all the 
range and endurance needed for open-ocean ASW can be achieved. Aircraft carried by 
the LCS are used to detect and engage enemy submarines. However, the constrained 
datalink capabilities limits the ability to accomplish this in a single sortie. Improving the 
datalink capabilities allows information and processing of contacts while aircraft are in 
flight. Shipboard sonar operators can receive acoustic data and other communications 
from aircraft in flight simultaneously passing information back to aircraft to prosecute 
enemy submarines.   
B. RESPONSE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to conclude this report and provide the stakeholders with the information 
needed to make a decision, the responses to the research questions are summarized: 
(1) Which LCS variant performs open-ocean ASW better? 
The Freedom variant is expected to perform ASW better than the Independence 
variant based on the information and analysis within this report. The Freedom has a 
greater speed than the Independence. The Freedom is also able to load equipment easier 
than the Independence. 
(2) What changes need to be made to the LCS to facilitate effective open-
ocean ASW?  
Several capability gaps were identified: acoustic control, range and endurance, 
and datalink capabilities. These gaps were addressed by noise reduction around the hull 
of LCS, internal sound isolation, ownship radiated noise awareness, weight reductions 
and extra fuel loading, throttle control and mixed-mode transits, and the inclusion of CV-
TSC to the LCS. The potential acoustic, datalink, range and endurance improvements 





(3) How effective will the proposed solution be at open-ocean ASW? 
Open-ocean ASW requires addressing all of the capability gaps this report 
identified. Without improvements in those areas, the LCS cannot effectively perform 
open-ocean ASW missions. 
(4) How much will the proposed solution cost? 
While selection criteria for potential solutions did include cost and feasibility, 
insufficient data to address the cost of the proposed solutions with reasonable accuracy 
was found. Therefore, the authors leave developing cost of proposed solutions as an area 
for future study.   
(5) How much more effective will the proposed solution be compared to the 
current LCS platforms? 
Any acoustic control improvement to the LCS would increase the effectiveness 
since no current systems are used. Increasing fuel storage and mixed-mode throttle 
control can increase range by 22 percent. Increased datalink capability can reduce aircraft 
detect to neutralize from two or more sorties to a single sortie.   
C. AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY 
In order to improve the LCS for open-ocean ASW in addition to 
recommendations herein, future researchers should address continued effort and study of 
acoustic control, increased range capability, and a more robust datalink with aircraft. In 
addition, the cost associated with potential improvements requires further study.    
The LCS uses a water jet propulsion system, and little work has been made on 
decreasing the acoustic signature of this system. This is investigation that future 
researchers should explore. Additionally, the traditional acoustic control systems 
currently available may not be compatible with a water jet system and compatibility 
should be evaluated. Reduction of radiated noise from on board systems and propulsion 
shall need to be addressed in order for open-ocean ASW sensors to be most effective.   
During this study, the range of the LCS was considered a capability gap even if 
the requirement of 3500 nautical miles was met. When comparing the LCS to the frigate 
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(FFG-7), the LCS range was considerably less than that of the FFG-7. If the LCS is to 
replace the FFG-7, then the LCS needs to meet all the requirements of the frigate. To 
achieve this goal, this study explored reducing weight from the LCS by removing the 
VDS system and replacing VDS with extra fuel storage. It is unlikely that the VDS is 
fully utilized in the identified CONOPS.   
The VDS was evaluated as an active sensor only but also has inherent passive 
capability. If the VDS is to be retained, the system’s passive sensor effectiveness should 
be further investigated. 
A final area of future research is further study of the data link. Data link 
bandwidth between the LCS and aircraft was insufficient and considered a gap for this 
study. As sensor resolution increases, the bandwidth required between aircraft and LCS 
will increase. Therefore, a robust, high bandwidth data link is a paramount concern for 
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